A 2020 Committee Said Leave IBBI. A 2026 Bill Makes It Permanent.

The section requires only that a valuer be "registered as a valuer... in such manner, on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed," leaving the regulator's identity to be filled in later. It was filled in through Section 458, a general delegation power letting the Central Government hand any of its functions under the Act to an authority named by notification.

That notification, GSR 1316(E) dated 18 October 2017, is the entire legal basis for IBBI regulating valuers, a history covered in more detail in Why India Carved Out a Separate Profession Just for Valuation. Nine years on, the authority still rests on a notification rather than on a line in the Companies Act.

On 30 August 2019 the Ministry of Corporate Affairs constituted a Committee of Experts to examine whether valuers needed a dedicated institutional framework. It was chaired by M. S. Sahoo, at the time IBBI's own Chairperson. The Committee reported on 31 March 2020 with a Draft Valuers Bill, 2020, open for public comment until 14 May 2020.

Its central recommendation was to move valuer regulation out of IBBI altogether, into a new standalone statutory body, a National Institute of Valuers, with existing professional valuer organisations continuing as front-line regulators underneath it. The scope proposed was wider than Section 247, reaching all valuation-related services rather than only Companies Act and IBC work.

The irony is built into the composition. The person best positioned to recommend that IBBI give up this function was the person running IBBI. The Bill was never introduced in Parliament. It sits on the record as a shelved proposal, not a repealed one.

The Corporate Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 (Bill No. 85 of 2026) was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 23 March 2026 and referred the same day to a Joint Parliamentary Committee chaired by Sudheer Gupta. Clause 73 amends Section 247 to designate IBBI directly as the "Valuation Authority," with power to:

• Grant certificates of registration and recognition to registered valuers and their organisations
• Recommend valuation standards to the Central Government
• Enforce compliance, including suspending a valuer's certificate for up to ten years or imposing a penalty of up to ₹10 lakh

A companion provision inserts a new Section 33-A extending the framework to LLPs on a mutatis mutandis basis, covering valuation of partner contributions, assets, net worth and liabilities. A separate clause requires valuers for company-law purposes to be appointed by the Audit Committee through a formal resolution rather than left to management.

Where the 2017 notification made IBBI a regulator by delegation, revocable in principle by a later notification, Clause 73 would make it one by name in the Act. That is a materially different kind of permanence.

The Statement of Objects and Reasons does not reference the 2020 Committee, the Draft Valuers Bill, or the National Institute of Valuers concept at all. Commentary has treated Clause 73 as a live, contested choice rather than a settled improvement, on three grounds:

• Mandate mismatch. Valuation work spans mergers and acquisitions, fund-raising, buy-backs, related-party transactions, financial reporting, taxation and family settlements, none of it inside IBBI's institutional core of insolvency resolution.
• Capacity. IBBI would oversee land and building, plant and machinery, and securities and financial assets on top of an insolvency docket already under strain.
• Independence. Where a valuer works inside an active IBC proceeding, one regulator overseeing both the process and the valuer's discipline within it creates, at minimum, an appearance problem.

No commonly cited comparator jurisdiction houses valuer regulation inside its insolvency regulator, not the UK's RICS model, Singapore's Institute of Valuers, or Australia's ASIC. A government committee chaired by IBBI's own chief once concluded the function should not sit there. Six years later a Bill puts it there permanently, without engaging that conclusion on the record.

Two things are worth stating plainly rather than guessing at. The Joint Parliamentary Committee has begun work but has not tabled a report in either House, so whether it will endorse, amend or question Clause 73 is not established from the public record. And no public representation from ICAI RVO, ICMAI RVO, ICSI RVO or the Institution of Valuers has surfaced, despite those bodies being the front-line regulators most directly affected.

Separately from the Bill, an IBBI discussion paper released 14 November 2025 proposed collapsing the current split, where CIRP valuations follow internationally accepted valuation standards while liquidation valuations follow the Companies (Registered Valuers and Valuation) Rules, 2017, into one unified standard, alongside a broadened fair-value definition and a new Coordinator Valuer role for larger matters. Clause 73 would not create IBBI's posture toward valuers from nothing. It would ratify a role IBBI is building out regardless of what Parliament does.

Change nothing today. Section 247 as it stands is unchanged until an enacted amendment says otherwise, and a Bill referred to committee is not law. Track the Committee's report rather than the commentary, and treat the ten-year suspension and ₹10 lakh penalty as the provisions worth reading closely if it advances, because those are the ones that would reach an individual valuer's practice.

The larger question is not procedural. A committee said this function does not belong in an insolvency regulator. A Bill says it does, permanently, and gives no reason. Whichever way Clause 73 lands, it settles something the profession has had open since 2017: whether IBBI's role here was always meant to be permanent, or was a placeholder that outlasted its own logic.